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Political scientists believe that the Abu Sayyaf Group’s (ASG) penchant for 
accumulating funds through hostage ransoming and other criminal activity has caused the 
organization to drift away from its Islamic foundations to become bandits. This research 
explores this claim by applying geospatial analysis to ASG terrorist activity to evaluate if 
ASG attack data are congruent with original political objectives or more suited to profit-
driven criminal patterns of activity. 
Four research objectives are used that explore if attack data display an operational 
shift. The first three compare data distribution to map overlays of economic level, 
ethnicity and religion to identify where attack majorities occur. This identifies if the ASG 
is prone to attacking areas populated by their constituency. The fourth objective examines 
the history of the ASG by comparing it to terrorist ideological transformation theory. The 
results of these objectives are combined in the decision rule to evaluate if ASG data 
supports the claims of a philosophical shift. Applied methods include spatio-temporal 
analysis and geostatistics (hot spot analysis and mean center progression). 
Results of analysis indicate that the majority of ASG attacks occur in a trivariate 
convergence area of map overlays. Temporal analysis shows that attacks localized and 
peaked around the Constituency Overlay in accordance with benchmarks for a terror-to-
crime shift. It is concluded that the majority of ASG attacks are driven towards crime due 





decision rule, the patterns of attack data indicate that ASG operations have been more 
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In 2007, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was labeled as the smallest, but deadliest 
Muslim terrorist organization in the Philippines by the Reuters news agency (Mogato, 
2007). Since their start in 1992, their operations against the Filipino state have claimed 
many lives and struck fear into the predominantly Catholic population. They have drawn 
no moral lines in the pursuit of their goals and have openly admitted to being responsible 
for numerous bombings, kidnappings and executions. Political science scholars believe 
that the ASG’s propensity for accumulating funds through hostage ransoming and other 
criminal activity has caused the organization to drift away from its radical Islamic 
foundations and become nothing more than a gang of bandits (Abuza, 2008; Tan, 2007). 
This research explores this claim by applying geographic and temporal analysis to ASG 
terrorist activity from 1994 to 2008. Specifically, this research will utilize spatial overlay 
methods and map analysis to determine whether the body of ASG attack data is 
congruent with the political objectives put forth by the group at their inception, or more 
suited to criminal patterns of activity that epitomize monetary gains as the highest 








Previous scholarly literature involving the ASG has focused on the historical 
aspects of past operations (Tan, 2007) along with the qualitative analysis of the ASG’s 
ideology and leadership (Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau & Piggott, 2009). In addition, Ressa 
(2003) and other authors have written narrative depictions of the ASG’s savagery in 
hopes of vilifying them. There has been little geographic scholarship analyzing the broad 
trending of ASG’s attack patterns, let alone whether they indicate a transformation from 
politically-driven terrorism to for-profit crime. This is a disturbing state as geographic 
researchers use spatial analysis to provide insight into human objectives and behavior 
(Bailey & Gatrell, 1995).  
 It is the intent of this project to apply geospatial analytical methods to the body of 
ASG attack data to discern whether or not the attack history supports previously stated 
claims of the group’s divergence from its ideological foundations to for-profit criminal 
goals. However, while the expected results are that the analyses support a shift in 
organizational goals, it is an open question whether the change has occurred and whether 
the data act as a definitive indicator for the ASG’s change in operations. To address these 
issues, the project uses geospatial analysis to identify the spatial and temporal patterns 
that emerge when ASG attack data is converted to a map. Furthermore, it identifies if 
these patterns indicate whether ASG operations are more inclined towards ideological or 
criminal goals. 
This thesis has established four objectives that, when evaluated, will answer if 
ASG attack data can substantiate claims that the group has shifted its operational goals 




geographic data can be used to corroborate the terror-to-crime transformation by 
analyzing its manifestation according to the group’s base of community support. Their 
purposes are to compare the attack data to overlays of economic level, ethnic composition 
and religion to identify where the majority of attacks occur. This will identify if the ASG 
is prone to conducting attacks in areas predominantly populated by their constituency, 
which are the poor, Muslim Tausugs of the southern Philippines. The fourth objective 
will examine the historical timeline of the ASG to see if qualitative analyses can support 
that a terror-to-crime transformation has occurred. This is done by comparing the 
historical timeline of the ASG to Dishman’s (2001) theory on the ideological 
transformation of terrorist groups. The results of these objectives are then combined and 
measured in the decision rule to evaluate whether ASG attack data supports the more 
popular claims of a philosophical shift. 
Objective 1: Determine the economic level of the areas where the majority of ASG 
attacks occur. 
 
 The southern third of the Philippines has historically been one of the poorest 
regions of the country. It is wrought with a decaying infrastructure that is sometimes 
unable to provide even the basic water and sanitation services to the population. This 
poverty has often been a source of contention among the Moro people of the south and 
their “better off” Christian Filipino countrymen of Luzon and the Visayas islands 
(Bauzon, 1991). The contempt towards their impoverished condition has even bled into 
the modern Islamic extremist movements of the southern Philippines and has been 
identified by armed groups as one of the reasons for their insurgency. Economic level 




poverty against the distribution of ASG attacks to see where the majority of attacks 
occur. 
Objective 2: Determine the ethnic composition of the areas where the majority of 
ASG attacks occur. 
 
 The ethnic ties that bind the people of archipelagic Southeast Asia are often 
stronger than the religious ties in their communities. These ties date back to the ethno-
linguistic divides that existed well before the coming of Islam and the concepts of a 
nation-state. The ASG was established by Abdurajak Janjalani as being a champion for 
the Tausug ethnic group of the Sulu archipelago. Ethnic composition analysis is 
conducted by comparing a layer of Tausug ethnic distribution against the distribution of 
ASG attacks to see where the majority of attacks occur.  Should a majority of ASG 
attacks manifest within the Tausug ethnic area, then it may indicate a compromise of that 
value.   
Objective 3: Determine the religious dominance of the areas where the majority of 
ASG attacks occur.  
 
 The ASG is, first and foremost, a religious extremist movement. Its foundations 
are rooted in the Muslim Moro wars that have persisted in their homeland since the first 
arrival of the Spanish conquistadors and its modern terror tactics were passed down from 
the mujahedeen struggle during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Klempp, 2006). It 
is logical that the religious dominance of areas where the ASG have conducted their 
attacks be analyzed to see if Muslim primacy is a deterrent to ASG activity. As religiosity 
in the Philippines is predominantly divided into either Christian or Muslim, religious 




Mindanao (ARMM) against the distribution of ASG attacks to see where the majority of 
attacks occur.  
Objective 4: Determine if ASG attack history indicates a shift from political 
terrorism to for-profit crime between 1994 and 2008. 
 
 Dishman (2001) uses a checklist for identifying the benchmarks that a terrorist 
group must experience before “mutating” into a criminal organization. In order, he states 
that a terrorist group must: 
1. Experience changing circumstances that forces it to dedicate a significant amount 
of its energy to profit-driven criminal acts.  
 
2. Experience a higher quality of group sustainability (spending capital and member 
income) after engaging in profit-driven criminal acts. 
 
3. Demonstrate an unwillingness to seek a negotiated settlement for the sake of 
prolonging the very struggle that affords it criminal revenue. 
 
 Dishman’s transformation checklist provides a road map that outlines a terrorist 
group’s metamorphosis from an Islamic extremist movement to a criminal organization. 
In order to match this with the other objectives, the project examines the ASG’s historical 
timeline to identify when and where the group met these benchmarks and the results that 
occurred afterward. 
 This analysis will also examine if the theory matches up to the important roles 
played by the ideological founder of the ASG, Abdurajak Janjalani, and the period after 
his death when the group was controlled by his brother, Khadafi. Political scientific 
literature states that these two individuals were moral compasses for the ASG; so much 
that Abdurajak’s death and Khadafi’s ascension steers the group towards crime rather 




Objectives one, two and three are meant to be compared to the conclusion of the 
fourth objective by studying the distribution of ASG attack data with three hypotheses 
that test how the pattern of attacks correlate to areal distributions of economic level, 
ethnicity and religion. These hypotheses are tested by using map analysis to determine if 
the ASG had developed a tendency to target members of its constituency rather than its 
political enemies. A clearer definition of the hypotheses and the techniques for their 
evaluation are provided in the research design chapter of this thesis. 
 
Significance of Research 
 Conducting the research required to analyze these data is valuable in many ways. 
First, this research acts as a case that can either support or deny Dishman’s 2001 
framework. This is an important academic and practical issue with many terrorist groups 
as this research will provide an analytical approach for their investigation. This 
substantiates the role of geospatial analysis to support the comprehensive evaluation of 
violent extremists. 
 Second, the methodology of this analysis can be applied outside of the political 
extremist realm and into other “shadowed” sectors of endeavor that have a large dataset 
of criminal activity. This means that the activities of pirates, smugglers, drug traffickers 
and slavers can be analyzed to better understand how they operate. 
 Third, this research engages in an empirical and geographical analysis of an 
Islamic extremist organization that has received little quantitative scholarship. As 




political and historical observation. This research contributes to the body of knowledge 
for the ASG. 
 Finally, this line of inquiry will benefit state policymakers by giving them 
information on how (and when) to best deploy military, intelligence and law enforcement 
assets to contain and confront these entities in their areas of operations. As non-
developed states are often the source of activities like the ones engaged by the ASG, 
understanding the spatial indicators of the terror-to-crime transformation can aid in the 
delivery of propaganda campaigns with the goal of depleting public support and potential 
safe havens. This is due to the fact that indigenous populations will turn against entities 
that pursue profit over a religious or philosophical ideology. 
 
Study Area 
 The study area for this research is the southern third of the Philippine archipelago, 
composing of the large island of Mindanao and the island chains of Basilan, Sulu and 
Tawi-Tawi (Figure 1.1). This area has been selected due to the high concentration of Abu 
Sayyaf activity in the past. Furthermore, it is the area often targeted for operations against 
the ASG by the Philippine National Police (PNP) and most recently, a combined effort by 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the US Army (Kingsbury, 2005). 
 Understanding the human geography of the study area is a key concept for 
understanding the conclusions of this project. Current popular sentiments and cultural 
conditions are the result of a 300-year period of conflict known as the Moro Wars 
(Bauzon, 1991). During these conflicts, the Muslims of the southern Philippines were 




imperialists, Japanese invaders and even their own fellow Christian Filipinos (Bauzon, 
1991). Each of these conflicts led to a defeat, with every chapter yielding a piece of the 
once extensive Islamic empire of Southeast Asia until all that was left for the “Moro” 
people, the indigenous Muslims of the southern Philippines, were the islands of 
Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. Even though the fighting has been over for some 
time, the consequences of prolonged warfare are still evident today in the violent tactics 
often used by the ASG. 
 The southern Philippines is one of the poorest regions in the whole country. 
According to the Philippine National Statistical Coordination Board (2006), nearly 50% 
of families within this region are living in poverty. Insufficient governmental support, 
rampant corruption and a dying tourism industry have accelerated the effects of three 
centuries of war and defeat. And while the major population centers do display indicators 
of modernity and development, the urban and rural poor populations far outnumber other 
economic classes. It is from these rural populations that the ASG gains its base of support 
and personnel. Many recruits join the ASG out of necessity due to operatives often being 
rewarded with a share of spoils obtained from an operation (ICPVTR, 2007). 
 The study area is ethnically divided between the mainland Maranao and the 
Tausug who populate Basilan and the Sulu archipelago. While the Moro Wars forced 
these two ethnic groups to work together, ethno-linguistic divides have always existed 
between these and other Filipino ethnic groups (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). It was not 
until the widespread acceptance of Islam that ethnic friction would be laid to rest, but the 
region still suffers from at least a mild ethnic division. The majority of ASG members 




 Politically, the current government of the Philippines is relatively stable in 
comparison to other developing states. Its independence in 1946 from the United States 
endeared Filipino lawmakers into modeling their new government after an American 
model, with similar structural subdivisions and electoral processes. The domestic political 
history of the Philippines is rife with corruption and unrest. This is evident in the 
southern parts of the state where numerous ethno-Islamic movements have sprouted in 
succession with hopes of being the “magic bullet” that frees Moro Filipinos from Manila 
and establishes an independent Muslim state. 
 The current situation for Muslims in the southern Philippines is one of relative 
stability. There exists an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an entity 
that while still subject to the laws of the state, conducts itself as a separate, provincial unit 
that chooses its own political administration and jurisprudence (Hedman and Sidel, 
2000). It was proposed by the once militantly-motivated Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) in exchange for the group’s disarmament and disbanding of a large portion of its 
militia. Established in 1996, the ARMM is composed of large areas of western Mindanao, 
Basilan and the Sulu archipelago (Abuza, 2003). These are the same areas that act as safe 
havens for the ASG (Chalk et al., 2009). 
 
Thesis Organization 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 establishes the research 
objectives and details the study area and significance of this project. The second chapter 
is the literature review that was conducted for topic research and familiarization. It 




the transformation of political extremist groups into for-profit criminal organizations. 
This will establish the theoretical foundations used by this project. The third chapter 
discusses the research design of this project. Specifically, the chapter covers the research 
methodology, success criteria and data sources of this master’s thesis. Chapter 4 details 
and discusses the results of the analysis conducted in the design chapter. This will be 
done by addressing each research objective and the decision rule in order. Finally, 
Chapter 5 will provide a conclusion to the project and discuss potential improvements to 
the methodology and what further lines of inquiry may be followed to improve upon the 




































Definition of Terrorism 
 Many definitions exist that either over-generalize terrorism by including 
rebellions, revolutions, uprisings and insurgencies as part of the concept, or conversely, 
excessively limit the concept by tying it down to one region, reason or religion. Terrorism 
is a very specific concept that can be related to many causes. This research adopts 
Hoffman’s (1998) definition of terrorism in that it is a deliberate creation and exploitation 
of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. 
 According to Krueger (2007), terrorism does not occur in a vacuum. It is a tactic 
often engaged by people who feel disenfranchised and marginalized by either their 
government or a greater social hierarchy. As such, people who engage in terrorism do not 
always fit the stereotypes often spread by popular media. They are not always poor, 
uneducated or part of a specific ethnicity or religion. And they are certainly not all 
“crazy” (Hoffman, 1998). Many terrorist masterminds have often been wealthy, educated 
members of the upper class who have chosen to use their influence as a means to achieve 
political change (Krueger, 2007). The greatest example of this type of terrorist is Osama 
bin Laden, the privileged son of a millionaire who studied at the famed King Abdulaziz 
University before becoming involved with Al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2002). In addition, 




tend to be middle-class, employed and able-bodied people who have chosen to risk or 
sacrifice their lives for a chance at lasting political change. In both the lower and upper 
echelons of terrorism, there exists similar factors in that they are frustrated with the 
current status quo, have a drive for lasting political change and lack the resources to 
affect this change through conventional means. Thus through process of elimination, 
terror becomes the most applicable and effective path and terrorists are those who employ 
this tactic for political goals.      
 
Definition of Crime 
 As this project deals with the possible organizational mutation of the ASG from 
political terrorism to for-profit crime, a definition for crime and criminal is necessary to 
conduct this research. As with terrorism, an abundance of definitions exists for crime. 
Crime can be viewed as the intentional (or unintentional) breach of the law regardless of 
the cause and it may be seen as maliciously driven activities pursued by evil intent. But 
for the purposes of this research, Crime will be defined as the engagement in illicit, and 
sometimes violent, activities for the purpose of generating profit and/or influence for a 
group or individual (Lyman & Potter, 2004).  
 Criminals are the groups or individuals who engage in illicit activities for the 
purpose of generating profit or influence. Like terrorists, criminals also use violence. But 
unlike terrorists, criminals engage in illegal and violent acts primarily out of selfish and 
personal motivations like material gains (Hoffman, 1998 & Sanderson, 2004). 
Demographically speaking, criminals come from all economic and social classes. This 




economically well-off. The reason for this is that lower-income people tend to place their 
need for material resources above any religious or ideological goals (Krueger, 2007). 
Another great difference between criminals and terrorists is that criminals are distinctly 
nonideological and are not interested in changing the status quo in which they thrive 
(Finckenauer, 2007). Terrorists are driven by ideology and have been known to resort to 
diplomacy and negotiation if it brings them closer to their goals. This is evident in the 
disarming and disbanding of El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) in 1992 (Jones & Libicki, 2008) and the disarmament of the Philippine’s Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) after the establishment of the ARMM (Hedman & 
Sidel, 2000).   
 
The Terror-to-Crime Transformation 
 As mentioned in the introduction, Dishman (2001) provides the clearest checklist 
by which to judge if a terrorist organization has moved away from its ideological goals 
towards a more profit-driven schema. He states that an organization transforms only after 
it has experienced changing circumstances that forces them to engage in increased 
criminal activity for fundraising, a higher quality of group sustainability after engaging in 
profit-driven criminal acts and an unwillingness to seek a negotiated settlement for the 
sake of prolonging the very struggle that affords it criminal revenue (Dishman, 2001). 
His work is supported and cited by other scholars who develop the concept of terrorist 
groups increasing their involvement in criminal activity. Wang (2010) builds upon 




activity due to the inherent similarities between terrorist and criminal organizations.  He 
presents these similarities in a 10 point list: 
1. Both are generally rational actors 
2. Both use extreme violence and the threat of reprisals 
3. Both use kidnappings, assassinations, and extortion 
4. Both operate secretly, though at times publicly in friendly territory 
5. Both defy the state and the rule of law (except when there is state sponsorship) 
6. For a member to leave either group is rare and often fatal 
7. Both present an asymmetrical threat to the United States and “friendly” nations 
8. Both can have “interchangeable” recruitment pools 
9. Both are highly adaptable, innovative and resilient 
10. Both have back-up leaders and foot soldiers 
Sanderson (2004) utilizes Dishman’s conclusions to expound further on the 
blurring lines between terror and crime. His research deals with how the constricting of 
terrorist financial support by counterterrorism efforts are forcing terror organizations to 
enter into criminal activity to maintain operational funding. He tips his hat to Dishman’s 
work by stating that it is “A very useful work on the ‘transformation’ issue completed in 
the pre-September 11 timeframe” (Sanderson, 2004). 
The ASG is not the only terrorist group to possibly undergo a terror-to-crime 
transformation in its operational history. Scholars have noted that some terrorist 
organizations have chosen to move away from their original ideological goals due to the 




 In analyzing the literature, the most notorious of these groups is the Colombian 
FARC. Makarenko (2004) states that the FARC deepened its involvement in narcotics 
trafficking following the 1990 death of the group’s ideological leader, Jacobo Arenas. 
The group escalated its participation from guarding coca fields and laboratories to acting 
as middle-men between the farmers and cocaine exporters. According to the US State 
Department, the FARC is one of the top 10 terrorist organizations with ties to the drug 
trade (Thachuk, 2008). The benchmarks of transformation can be applied to its history in 
that they experienced changing circumstances with Arenas’ death, their increased 
involvement in narcotics trafficking demonstrated a higher rate of success and 
sustainability and as they are nearing 50 years of operation, they hope to prolong the 
conditions in which they operate because of the lucrative income. 
 Another group who scholars believe has undergone the terror-to-crime 
transformation is the United Wa State Army (UWSA) of Myanmar (Dishman 2001). 
They have deep ties to the production of opium and heroin in the famed Golden Triangle 
of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. Originally the military arm of the Communist Party of 
Burma (CPB), the UWSA succeeded in “liberating” the Wa hills of northern Myanmar 
and effectively took over opium production for the area. This secured a fruitful method 
for sustainment and a ready source of revenue. The benchmarks of transformation can be 
applied to UWSA’s history in that their changing circumstances came in the form of a 
cease fire agreement with the (then) Burmese national government for neither side to 
attack the other. As they held the richest opium fields in the country, the UWSA did not 
pursue its goal of a communist Burma, instead choosing to maintain the very lucrative 




What is not mentioned in any other work other than Dishman is the complete 
abandonment of ideological goals in lieu of a life of crime. Instead, scholars like 
Makarenko (2004) explain that terror tactics and criminal activities exist along a 
continuum rather than in an either/or set up. Her conclusions that crime and terror exist 
along the same path are true to a point. But they rest on the assumption that the terrorist 
organization is still driven towards a political goal. And as Tan (2007) demonstrates with 
the ASG, the potential for ideological abandonment is always a possibility. Nonetheless, 
the literature supports the idea that no “either/or” condition can exist when dealing with 
terrorism and crime.  
 
The Abu Sayyaf Group 
 The organization of the ASG was a product of two important factors. The first is 
the historical background and behavior of the militant Moro movement. The foundation 
of the ASG can be traced back to the earliest attempts by Filipino Muslims to organize 
for the goal of governance over a separate sovereign entity. When the Philippines gained 
their independence in 1946, a renewed effort was initiated by the Moro people to vie for 
autonomy (Bauzon, 1991). It started through diplomatic channels and political 
participation at first. However, the predominantly Catholic central parliament in Manila 
saw little gain in releasing the Moro. This was when the freedom effort turned violent. 
This was also when the freedom effort began a vicious pattern of splintering due to 
member frustration. With every organizational division, the newer progeny emerged as 




 The history of modern Islamic separatism in the Philippines began with the 
Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) of 1968 (Bauzon, 1991). Their goal was to 
advocate and pursue the complete secession of Mindanao and Sulu from the Filipino 
state. As their efforts became hindered by defeat or perceived inaction however, the 
organization splintered into smaller and more radical bands of armed resisters looking to 
accomplish what their parent organization could not. From these splinter bands, the 
MNLF gained prominence over the other groups and eventually outlived the MIM itself 
(Abuza, 2003). As with the MIM, many Moro separatists had great hopes for the MNLF. 
Just as before, elements within the organization could not agree on the methods used to 
attain their goal. Many saw the establishment of the ARMM as an unequal compromise 
between the Muslim resistance and Christian Filipino regime. Frustrations rose once 
again and some members within the MNLF decided to splinter away from their mother 
organization to form the ASG in 1991(Singh, 2007). 
The second factors important to the history of the ASG are the group’s first two 
leaders, the Brothers Janjalani. The founder of the ASG was a former MNLF operative 
named Abdurajak Abubakr Janjalani. Abdurajak, who was once a school teacher, trained 
in a Mujahedeen outpost in Afghanistan where he aided the local Pashtuns in their fight 
against the soviet occupation. When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, he returned to 
Zamboanga City where he taught in a number of madrassas (Islamic schools) on the topic 
of Islamic jurisprudence (ICPVTR, 2007).  
 As the MNLF began to step away from their separatist goal in lieu of autonomy in 
1989, Abdurajak became disheartened by what he viewed was defeatism and 




Hector) and established a camp in the jungles of Basilan in 1991. From here, he 
reconnected with his old Mujahedeen cohort and began to buy weapons and facilitate 
training for his men with the expectation of pushing the Moro struggle forward through 
violent means.  
 In 1992, the ASG began a campaign of terror attacks (Abuza, 2005). Bombings, 
kidnappings, murder; the ASG’s earlier operations always made a political statement to 
the ruling Christian majority. The operational peak of Abdurajak's leadership came in 
1995, when ASG operatives assaulted the town of Ipil, killing 57 and razing the entire 
town center (Ramakrishna and Tan, 2003). Then in December of 1998, an attempted 
arrest turned into a fierce gun battle between ASG operatives and the Filipino national 
police. During the fighting, Abdurajak Janjalani was shot and killed (Singh, 2007). When 
news of his brother’s death reached Khadafi, he took over the duties of leadership for the 
group.  
Under Khadafi’s guidance, the ASG engaged in more criminal fundraising 
operations, increasing their funding and becoming more proficient in explosive 
implementation and coastal raiding. It was during Khadafi’s leadership that the group 
broke into the international spotlight with the kidnapping of the American journalist, 
Jeffrey Schilling (ICPVTR, 2007). For nearly 10 years, Khadafi’s ASG were able to keep 
an operational pace of one to two attacks per month. During this time, the ASG shifted 
the majority of its operations to criminal activities. Hostage ransom, narcotics trafficking, 
extortion; the income gained from these activities gradually eroded the goals set by 
Abdurajak at the group’s founding. Then just like his brother, Khadafi Janjalani was shot 




 Khadafi’s death marked a watershed moment for the ASG. From the outside, the 
group’s change in leadership appeared seamless as it transferred to the next in line. But 
history shows that there was something missing in the months following his death. The 
number of operations dropped sharply along with the number of successful sorties. The 
political message of the ASG went silent as the Filipino military increased its operations 
in the south in an attempt to shut the group down. The military nearly succeeded. In the 
end, the combined operations of the PNP and the AFP had whittled the support base of 
the ASG from several thousand to less than 200 (Chalk et al., 2009).    
 
Geographic Analysis and Behavior 
 Bailey and Gatrell (1995) state that an essential requirement for any analysis of 
geographic data is to be able to “see” how the points are distributed across a two 
dimensional plane. For spatial data, like the ASG attack distribution, this means plotting 
the individual points across a map. When the attack data are laid atop the landmasses of 
the Philippine archipelago, visual patterns emerge that give clues to the ASG’s behavior. 
There could be groupings of points or “clusters” that may indicate how frequent a 
location is targeted. Clusters may vary according to attack type to indicate how the ASG 
approaches operations in a certain part of the study area. For example, if there are a 
greater amount of kidnappings on the island of Basilan in comparison to the island of 
Jolo or Tawi-Tawi, this may be an indicator of an ASG safe haven on Basilan due to the 
group’s ability to effectively capture and secure hostages. Conversely, a high frequency 
of bombings over all other types of attacks in Davao Del Sur may indicate the edges of 




remotely detonated by a single operative without the need of safe houses and “getaway” 
routes. In both instances, the data are visualized on a map and allowed to “speak” for 
itself, potentially revealing clues as to agent behavior (Bailey & Gatrell, 1995). 
 Cartographic texts describe data analysis through visualization as “data 
exploration.” Data exploration seeks four major purposes in geovisualization (Slocum, 
McMaster, Kessler & Howard, 2009): 
1. Identify the spatial pattern for a single attribute at one point in time. 
2. Compare spatial patterns for two or more attributes at one point in time. 
3. Identify how the spatial pattern of a single attribute changes over time. 
4. Compare the spatial patterns of two or more attributes to see how they covary 
over time. 
Purposes 3 and 4 are the focus of this research project. The patterns of ASG attack 
data, compared over time, allow clues to arise depicting when and how their behavior 
changed from political terror to crime. Time and location are the keys to identifying this 
change. 
Along with the computer visualization of ASG attack data, the use of geographic 
statistical methods adds strength to conclusions made by data exploration. This is due to 
the mathematical approaches of statistics that create analyses that, while small in scale, 
are empirically robust (Rogerson, 2006). Scholars argue that conclusions based solely on 
map analyses are incomplete without some quantitative testing (Bailey & Gatrell, 1995; 
Rogerson, 2006). This is why this research project conducts statistical tests in addition to 




The use of computer-assisted geographic analysis is not uncommon in the field of 
criminology. Wilson (2007) states that the use of computers in map analysis has created a 
stronger bond between criminological theory and spatial analysis by being able to 
synthesize hundreds of individual incidents into holistic patterns that give clues to 
criminal motives and behaviors. Computers act as a vehicle for fast processing of large 
datasets. Mean center, clustering analysis, kernel density, all types of statistical analyses 
that can be applied to point phenomena have been utilized to study crime for both 
descriptive and normative goals. 
A particular approach accessible only by GIS is the use of map animation. In this 
method, events are posted on a map chronologically to display when and where they 
occur in regards to the entire dataset. Through this method, overall patterns of activity 
can be discerned that demonstrate how behaviors increase, decrease and migrate across a 
space (Brunsdon, Corcoran & Higgs, 2007). As this method has been used to analyze 
drug sales, assaults and car thefts, the same methods were repurposed to analyze ASG 
attack data. The animation sequentially displayed when and where the attacks occurred 
and displayed how attack patterns manifested in comparison to Dishman’s (2001) 
benchmarks. The only differences between crime and terrorism analyses are the study 














Meeting the objectives of this research project serves to answer whether or not the 
spatial and temporal patterns of ASG attack data demonstrate a difference in 
organizational goals between political terror and crime. This chapter details the 
components of the research to achieve the objectives put forth in the introduction. The 
decision rule of the project is discussed, as are the preprocessing and sources of data. An 
overall plan of the research is displayed in Figure 3.1. The research first examines the 
attack data and its distribution according to poverty, ethnicity and religion respectively. 
This is done through the evaluation of three hypotheses, each of which is assigned to its 
own objective: 
• Objective #1: H1 (Poverty): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a 
majority of attacks have occurred in areas where 50% of the population or greater 
are living below the poverty line. 
 
• Objective #2: H2 (Ethnicity): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a 
majority of attacks have occurred in the ethnically homogeneous areas populated 
by the Tausug. 
 
• Objective #3: H3 (Religion): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a 
majority of attacks have occurred in areas largely populated and administered by 
Muslims. 
 
After the evaluation of these hypotheses, objective four is substantiated by first 
examining the historical development of the ASG and linking important events in its 




outcomes of the aforementioned hypotheses are then applied to the decision rule for final 
analysis and evaluation. The results should indicate that geographic data supports claims 
that the ASG has undergone a transformation from political violence to for-profit crime. 
 
Analytical Procedures Conducted on Dataset 
The objectives of this project require a combination of empirical, quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. The empirical and quantitative measures will be used to meet 
objectives one, two and three. Their purposes are to explore whether geographic data 
manifests in areas populated by poor, Muslim Tausugs, thus examining if the ASG 
prefers to select targets within the areas of their constituency. The qualitative measures 
are meant to meet objective four. Its purpose is to define a logical link between the 
behavior of the ASG and the motives behind their actions. The overall methodological 
flow of this project is described in Figure 3.2, in which empirical, quantitative and 
qualitative analyses are conducted in parallel before being combined for the decision rule. 
 Objectives 1, 2 and 3 take the body of ASG attack data and examine it in a spatial 
context to determine if the majority of attacks have been targeted in constituent areas. In 
other words, areas composed of poor, Muslim Tausugs; the same demographic makeup of 
the average ASG operative according to Klempp (2006) and Chalk et al. (2009). The 
purposes of Objectives 1 through 3 are to determine if the geographic patterns of attack 
data support allegations of a shift in the ASG’s organizational goals from political terror 
to for-profit crime. These objectives are written into three testable hypotheses that, when 
evaluated and applied to the CO decision rule, display how the ASG’s operational goals 




Objective #1: Determine the economic level of the areas where the majority of ASG 
attacks occur. 
 
• H1 (Poverty): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority 
of attacks have occurred in areas where 50% of the population or greater are 
living below the poverty line. 
 
 In a group profile delivered by the International Center for Political Violence and 
Terrorism (ICPVTR) in 2007, the ASG is identified as having the operational goal of 
ridding Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago of all Christian influence in order to return 
the wealth “stolen” by Western influences to the indigenous people of this area. Should 
the majority of attacks occur within highly impoverished areas, it may be concluded that 
the ASG is not targeting highly affluent western entities and is instead pursuing targets of 
opportunity.  
H1 is tested by map analysis. For the map analysis, a map of the Philippines is 
constructed using a base layer of Filipino provinces and plotted with a point distribution 
of ASG attacks from 1994-2008. As previously noted, the mapped attacks are armed 
assaults, bombings and hostage takings. The areal overlay displaying the provinces in the 
study area with greater than 50% of the population living in poverty will be matched over 
the base provincial boundaries and compared to the pattern of ASG attack data. It is 
expected that the majority of attack data will occur in these areas of extreme poverty. All 
map analysis, cartography and statistics will be performed using the ArcGIS 9.3 software 
package (ESRI, 2009). 
Objective #2: Determine the ethnic composition of the areas where the majority of 
ASG attacks occur. 
 
• H2 (Ethnicity): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority 






   The same ICPVTR (2007) profile describes the ASG as having goals that are 
“ethnocentric,” meaning that the group’s overall objectives are meant to benefit a single 
constituent ethnicity. For the ASG, this ethnic group is the Tausug, which encompasses 
the majority of people in the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi (Stark, 
2003). This is a logical conclusion in that the majority of ASG members are also Tausugs 
(Klempp, 2006). Should the majority of attacks occur in areas dominated by the Tausug, 
it may be concluded that the ASG is willing to endanger (or target) members of its ethnic 
constituency in order to achieve its fundraising goals.   
Like H1, H2 is tested by map analysis. The map of the Philippines contains the 
same base layer of Filipino provinces and plotted ASG armed assaults, bombings and 
hostage takings from 1994-2008. The areal overlay displaying the provinces in the study 
area with a majority of the population being of Tausug ethnicity will be matched over the 
base provincial boundaries and compared to the pattern of ASG attack data. It is expected 
that the majority of attack data will occur in these areas of Tausug majority. 
Objective #3: Determine the religious dominance of the areas where the majority of 
ASG attacks occur.  
 
• H3 (Religion): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority 
of attacks have occurred in areas largely populated and administered by 
Muslims. 
 
 The ASG is based upon a foundation of violent Islamic extremism. Abdurajak 
Janjalani, the first leader of the ASG, stated that the group was founded to establish an 
independent Islamic state composed of the island regions of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and 
Tawi-Tawi for the moral betterment of Filipino Muslims (ICPVTR, 2007). Should a large 




that the ASG is willing to compromise its foundational mores in order to collect revenue 
from extortion and kidnapping for ransom. 
H3 is tested with map analysis. The map of the Philippines contains the same base 
layer of Filipino provinces and plotted ASG armed assaults, bombings and hostage 
takings from 1994-2008. The areal overlay displaying the political boundaries of the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is matched over the base provincial 
boundaries and compared to the pattern of ASG attack data. It is expected that the 
majority of attack data will occur in these areas of Muslim authority. 
Objective #4: Determine if ASG attack history indicates a shift from political 
terrorism to for-profit crime between 1994 and 2008. 
 
The fourth objective is met by linking the operational history of the ASG to the 
three terror-to-crime transformation benchmarks detailed in the introduction. Each 
benchmark is matched to a known event in the ASG’s history to demonstrate how, 
according to Dishman (2001), the events built upon each other to lure the ASG away 
from its original religious separatist goals. Case studies involving the terror-to-crime 
transformations of other organizations are explored in the Literature Review to show how 
these benchmarks have occurred in other areas. These are the transformation benchmarks 
regarding the operational histories of the FARC and the UWSA. 
Along with the qualitative analysis and matching benchmarks to events in the 
ASG timeline, a rough temporal examination of the ASG attack data is conducted to see 
if attack frequency increase according to changes in their leadership. ASG attacks are 
plotted across a timeline to examine when the highest frequencies of events occur, 
regardless of their location. This analysis is conducted to define which ASG leader, 




is useful to achieving objective four because previous ASG scholars (Abuza 2003; Ressa 
2003; Tan 2007) have posited that Abdurajak’s death is responsible for the ASG’s shift 
into crime. If that is the case, then an increased frequency of attacks after Khadafi’s 
ascension will strengthen the claim of Abdurajak’s death as Dishman’s first benchmark 
for the ASG. Charts are created for all attack types using ArcGIS. 
 
The Decision Rule 
 The question of whether or not the ASG attack data indicates ideological or 
criminal goals is hard to answer. This is because quantitative data are more often than 
not, an indicator of “Where’s” and “When’s,” rather than “Why’s.” The decision rule for 
this research utilizes three conditions that, if satisfied, conclude that the geographic data 
of ASG attacks support previous scholarly claims of a terror-to-crime transformation. 
These conditions are: 
1. 50% or greater of ASG attacks will occur in the “Constituency Overlay,” an 
area made up of the overlapping provinces within the poverty, Tausug and 
religion overlays. 
 
2. The operational peaks in the ASG timeline are focused within the CO. 
 
3. The operational peaks in attack data will coincide with Dishman’s 




Definition of the Constituency Overlay 
The first through third objectives of this research are to determine the distribution 
of attacks according to economic, ethnic and religious variables. These objectives are in 




of their constituency. This is best represented by a Venn diagram depicting the 
convergence of the poverty, Tausug and religious variables (Figure 3.3). 
This trivariate convergence zone, or Constituency Overlay (CO), holds twofold 
importance for the decision rule of this research. First, it is logically the least possible 
area of political terror operations for the ASG because the majority of people living 
within are the support base that the group depends on for political success (Hoffman, 
1998). In other words, what political value is there for a marketplace bombing that mostly 
victimizes a terrorist group’s constituency? Second, previous scholarship on organized 
crime states that criminals are more likely to function within home communities because 
of the high levels of fear and influence that they can exert on the local population (Lyman 
& Potter, 2004). This allows criminals to operate more freely (and sometimes openly) in 
home communities.  
Because the CO is the least logical area for political terror and a potential haven 
for criminals, it acts as an expression for ASG attack data. Should an attack be located 
within the CO, it is categorized as an act of crime, rather than political terror. If an attack 
occurs outside of the constituency overlay, this research presumes that the effort was 
made for a political gain instead of a criminal one. The number of overall attacks 
occurring within the CO is measured along with their frequency over time to substantiate 
how the ASG pattern distributes across the area. Should a majority of all attacks (greater 
than 50%) lie within the CO and spatio-temporal quantitative analysis links the group’s 
operational peaks to the same area, then this research concludes that the ASG has 
engaged in criminal activity within their constituent areas. Temporally, ASG attack 




Should these temporal peaks coincide with the ASG terror-to-crime transformation 
benchmarks discussed in Objective 4, then this research will rule that ASG operations are 
more inclined towards criminal goals rather than political ones. 
 
Spatial Statistical Testing on the CO 
The two statistical tests used on the CO are mean center progression and Getis-
Ord hot spot analysis. The purpose of the mean center calculation is to determine the 
average “x, y” coordinate of a point distribution across a plane. Thus, depending on 
where and how a point distribution clusters determines where the average manifests. 
Mean center measurements are applied to each attack type and timeframe to create a map 
that “tracks” how the distribution of events have progress across time. Should the mean 
centers of a particular type of attack appear close to the constituency overlay, then it 
provides statistical strength to the map analysis and helps answer the research question of 
whether or not attack patterns indicate if the ASG attack history is more inclined towards 
ideological or criminal goals. Keep in mind that the dataset, while only covering 1994-
2008, also includes attacks that have occurred on the islands of Luzon, Palawan and 
Samar, outside of the study area. This is to demonstrate that the dataset is complete and 
no incidents have been omitted.  
Hot spot rendering displays the clustering of events within the study area. This 
method calculates the Getis-Ord Gi statistic and then applies a cold-to-hot type of 
rendering to the output Z scores (ESRI, 2009). It was selected for its focus on the terrain 
rather than the individual events. This test works by looking at each province within the 




have a high number of attacks and be surrounded by other provinces with high values as 
well. The local sum for a province and its neighbors is compared proportionally to the 
sum of all provinces. When the local sum differs greatly from the expected local sum 
(and that difference is too large to be the result of random chance), a statistically 
significant Z score results (ESRI, 2009). The resultant Z score indicates where features 
with either high or low values cluster spatially. Dividing it across time will display 
patterns in attacks and show when and where attacks are frequent and how spread out 
they are across the study area. Looking at hot spots across time provides an additional 
perspective for questions of both space and leadership as it can add insight to the ASG’s 
past operational goals. In other words, concentrated hot spots over the CO can strengthen 
the claim that ASG operations are directed toward criminal profits. The timeframes in 
which they occur indicate under whose command the ASG was during that period.   
 
Data Preparation and Preprocessing 
 The data collected for this research require some preprocessing in preparation for 
analysis. The ASG attack data are compiled as a large list and digitized into point 
shapefiles in ArcGIS. Four shapefiles are created that encompass the entire spatial 
distribution of attack data: 
1. An “All Attacks” shapefile that plots every attack as a single event, regardless of 
type. 
 
2. An “Armed Assaults” shapefile that plots only the events in which the primary 
method of attack are melee and small arms. 
 
3. A “Bombings” shapefile that plots only the events in which the primary method 





4. A “Hostage Takings” shapefile that plots only the events in which the primary 
goal of attackers is the kidnapping of a victim. 
 
Each of the attacks in the dataset can be categorized into one of these three attack 
types. In the event where an attack utilizes a combination of all three methods, then a 
stepped classification schema is used to ensure that an attack can only be entered into one 
category and not counted twice. The steps ascend in levels of magnitude, where armed 
assaults are the lowest rung, bombings in the middle and hostage takings at the top. Thus, 
a 3/20/1998 attack by the ASG in Abungabung listed as a combined bombing, armed 
assault and hostage taking by the Global Terrorism Database (2010) is categorized only 
as a hostage taking because that is the ultimate goal of the perpetrators.  
 
Creation of the Overlays 
The economic, ethnic and religious overlays are created using the Philippine 
provinces as the base units of analysis. Using data sources as guides, three ArcGIS 
polygon shapefiles are created to symbolize the research variables: 
1. Poverty Overlay (PO): Provinces with greater than or equal to 50% of the 
population living below the poverty line (Figure 3.4). 
 
2. Tausug Overlay (TO): Provinces with Tausug ethnic majority (Figure 3.5). 
3. Religion Overlay (RO): Provinces within the political boundaries of the ARMM 
(Figure 3.6). 
 
The maximum extent of these overlays is comprised of the study area boundaries. 
In addition, the constituency overlay polygon shapefile is created using the provinces that 
fall within all three of the aforementioned overlays. It consists of the provinces of 




Temporal Division of Data 
Preparation of the data for temporal and statistical analysis consists of dividing 
the dataset into individual timeframes in order to examine the spatiotemporal progression 
of events into overlay areas. As the dataset timeline spans from 2/18/1994 until 
12/28/2008, seven 2-year timeframes were created using February 18th as the cut-off date. 
An eighth timeframe is made to include the 10 months and 8 days, which do not fall into 
the 2-year intervals. The timeframes (TF) are categorized using the military phonetic 
alphabet. This practice helps to prevent confusion between similar sounding letters, such 
as "D" and "E", and reduces the amount of text necessary for timeframe labeling on maps 
and charts. The timeframes for this research project are: 
• TF Alpha: 2/18/1994 – 2/18/1996 
• TF Bravo: 2/19/1996 – 2/18/1998 
• TF Charlie: 2/19/1998 – 2/18/2000 
• TF Delta: 2/19/2000 – 2/18/2002 
• TF Echo: 2/19/2002 – 2/18/2004 
• TF Foxtrot: 2/19/2004 – 2/18/2006 
• TF Golf: 2/19/2006 – 2/18/2008 
• TF Hotel: 2/19/2008 – 12/28/2008 
A 2-year timeframe interval is used to reduce the difficulty of accounting for 15 
timeframes and to prevent from having timeframes with only one attack in it. This 
facilitates the use of geospatial statistics in measuring and displaying mean centers. With 
the timeframes divided, additional ArcGIS point shapefiles are created for each 




time. This allows for a detailed “event-centric” analysis of progression through statistical 
methods. Additionally, polygon shapefiles are created for the study area to display how 
many events occur in each province according to time. This organization of data 
facilitates an “area-centric” approach to the analysis of ASG attacks. 
 
Data Sources 
 The ASG attack data were obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to 
Terrorism (START) and the University of Maryland (2010). It contains an itemized 
account of each kidnapping incident, bombing and shootout perpetrated by the ASG from 
1994 until 2008. The items included in each entry hold information pertaining to the date, 
location, attack method, hostages captured, injuries, fatalities and target type for each 
kidnapping. START collects their data from open source materials such as news feeds, 
existing datasets from private intelligence firms, legal documents, books and journals. 
Data on each attack are corroborated through different sources to the best of START’s 
abilities before being added to the GTD (START, 2010). 
 The sources of overlay data vary by individual topic. The data for the poverty 
shapefile were collected from a choropleth map distributed by the Philippine National 
Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB, 2006). The data for the ethnicity shapefile was 
collected from 2000 census data distributed by the Filipino government. Finally, the data 
for the political borders of the ARMM were collected from information distributed by the 




 The data layers utilized in the ArcGIS analysis come from two sources. The 
shapefiles for the Philippines were acquired from the Naga City Mapserver Portal, which 
is a GIS data clearinghouse maintained by the Naga City government in the Philippines. 
The shapefile for world countries was obtained from the Environmental Research 






Figure 3.1: Research Flowchart 
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Figure 3.3: Constituency overlay properties 
 
 






Figure 3.5: Areas of Tausug ethnic majority (colored in orange). 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The political boundaries of the ARMM (colored in red). 
 
 







RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 This chapter details the results of the aforementioned methods and discusses the 
reasons for their manifestation. In addition, an examination of how the results address the 
overall research goals (detailed in the introduction) is conducted by applying them to the 
project decision rule.  For the sake of organization, this chapter offers the results and 
discussion of each objective in numerical order before addressing the decision rule.  
 
Results of Research Objectives 
Objective #1: Determine the economic level of the areas where the majority of ASG 
attacks occur. 
 
 As explained in the research design section, meeting the goal of objective one is 
dependent on the validation of the H1 hypothesis. A null hypothesis (H0) was created to 
test the results of the analysis. Both are listed as: 
• H1 (Poverty): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority of 
attacks have occurred in areas where 50% of the population or greater are living 
below the poverty line. 
 
• H0 (Poverty): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority of 
attacks have not occurred in areas where 50% of the population or greater are 
living below the poverty line. 
 
To test the null hypothesis, the attack shapefiles are intersected with the Poverty Overlay 




Figure 4.1, where bombings are symbolized as yellow circles, hostage takings are purple 
triangles and armed assaults are red dots. 
It may seem intuitive that the numbers of events within the poverty overlay are 
the majority of the dataset. However, the two-dimensionality of this figure does not 
display how events “stack” upon themselves in areas outside of the overlay; specifically, 
in the cities of Zamboanga and Davao. It is necessary for the map analysis to conduct 
empirical measurements in order to pinpoint exact values. These are the results: 
• Of 143 individual events, 103 occur within the PO. This amounts to 71% of the 
entire attack dataset. 
 
• Of 69 bombings, 32 are in the PO. 
 
• Of 25 armed assaults, 22 are in the PO. 
 
• Of 49 hostage takings, 42 are in the PO. 
 
“Majority” is defined as being greater than half. As such, the results of this 
quantitative analysis support the rejection of the null hypothesis. H1 is accepted and 
objective one is determined; the majority of ASG attacks occur in areas where greater 
than or equal to 50% of the population are living below the poverty line. 
Questions arise as to why the numbers of events differ by attack type. Why is 
there a greater frequency of armed assaults and hostage-takings with the PO as opposed 
to bombings? Perhaps the “poor” do not merit the use of expensive weapon systems like 
explosives. More often than not, bullying and strong-arm tactics tend to be a more cost 
effective method of achieving the same result, community cooperation through fear 
(Finckenauer, 2007). This claim is supported by the high frequency of armed assaults in 




As for the high frequency of hostage-takings, impoverished areas are perfect 
sources for hostages as police presence is low and ASG operatives can seize foreign 
nationals who are in the Philippines for humanitarian reasons. These targets are less 
likely to have support or resort to violence. They tend to receive a higher ransom for their 
release. Poorer societies are not without their own “elites.” Local business owners, 
village officials and religious figures are often the source of ransom targets of 
opportunity for the ASG (Chalk et al., 2009).  
The prevalence of ASG attacks in poorer areas of the Philippines is, by itself, not 
a suitable indicator of a terror-to-crime transformation. Poor areas are a place where ASG 
operatives can openly operate with little risk for retribution. This comes as a combination 
of community support (both negative and positive) and the remoteness of their location.  
Objective #2: Determine the ethnic composition of the areas where the majority of 
ASG attacks occur. 
 
 As with objective one, meeting the goal of objective two is dependent on the 
validation of the H2 hypothesis. A null hypothesis (H0) was created to test the results of 
the analysis. Both are listed as: 
• H2 (Ethnicity): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority of 
attacks have occurred in the ethnically homogeneous areas populated by the 
Tausug. 
 
• H0 (Ethnicity): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority of 
attacks have not occurred in the ethnically homogeneous areas populated by the 
Tausug. 
 
To test the null hypothesis, the attack shapefiles are intersected with the Tausug Overlay 
(TO) to distinguish an overall pattern. The gross distribution of events can be seen in 
Figure 4.2, where bombings are symbolized as yellow circles, hostage takings are purple 




Unlike poverty, the layering of attacks over the TO does not give the intuitive 
impression that the numbers of events within the overlay are the majority of the dataset. It 
is necessary for the map analysis to conduct some empirical measurements in order to 
pinpoint exact values. These are the results: 
• Of 143 individual events, 79 occur within the TO. This amounts to 55% of the 
entire attack dataset. 
 
• Of 69 bombings, 24 are in the TO. 
 
• Of 25 armed assaults, 22 are in the TO. 
 
• Of 49 hostage takings, 33 are in the TO. 
 
With “majority” defined as being greater than half, the results of this quantitative 
analysis support the rejection of the null hypothesis. H2 is accepted and objective two is 
determined; the majority of ASG attacks occur in the ethnically homogeneous areas 
populated by the Tausug. 
As with Objective 1, the number of events within the TO differ according to 
attack type. Bombings are significantly less due to the linear pattern of events occurring 
on Pan-Philippine Hwy (AH26) between Cotabato City and General Santos City on the 
main island of Mindanao. Target information from the GTD (START, 2010) indicates 
that this pattern is mostly targeted towards private citizens and businesses. Nonetheless, 
the larger use of explosives outside of the TO is more in accordance with political 
terrorism than crime. 
The large occurrence of armed assaults within the TO may be an indication of the 
ASG conducting attacks on local authorities. Some are, but according to the GTD 




businesses. Temporal examinations display that the majority of assaults occur during 
Khadafi’s reign as the ASG leader.   
Foreigners are certainly targets of the hostage takings that occur in the TO. They 
are not the majority. Nineteen individual events are identified by the GTD (START, 
2010) as having been targeted at “private citizens.” That is 60% of all hostage takings 
(32) within the TO. Of these 19 attacks on the citizenry, 4 occur under the leadership of 
Abdurajak. The remaining civilian events occur during Khadafi’s tenure and are clustered 
around TF’s Delta and Hotel. These peaks of attacks indicate an economic rather than an 
ethnocentric reason for the kidnappings.  
The Tausug ethnic loyalty of the ASG is one of the foundations embedded by 
Abdurajak. The large amount of attacks targeted within Tausug areas is either an 
indication of careful targeting or violence geared towards other than pro-ethnic goals. An 
escalation occurs after Abdurajak’s death, indicating that organizational goals changed to 
pursue more violent activities in areas of ethnic constituency.  
Objective #3: Determine the religious dominance of the areas where the majority of 
ASG attacks occur.  
 
 Meeting the goal of objective three is dependent on the validation of the H3 
hypothesis. A null hypothesis (H0) was created to test the results of the analysis. Both are 
listed as: 
• H3 (Religion): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority of 
attacks have occurred in areas largely populated and administered by Muslims. 
 
• H0 (Religion): The distribution of ASG attack data indicates that a majority of 






To test the null hypothesis, the attack shapefiles are intersected with the Religion Overlay 
(RO) to distinguish an overall pattern. The gross distribution of events can be seen in 
Figure 4.3, where bombings are symbolized as yellow circles, hostage takings are purple 
triangles and armed assaults are red dots. 
The RO allows for the provinces of Lanao Del Sur and Maguindanao to be 
included in the analysis along with any events occurring within their borders. The 
empirical measurements conducted on the map analysis collected these results: 
• Of 143 individual events, 82 occur within the RO. This amounts to 57% of the 
entire attack dataset. 
 
• Of 69 bombings, 24 are in the RO. 
 
• Of 25 armed assaults, 22 are in the RO. 
 
• Of 49 hostage takings, 36 are in the RO. 
 
With “majority” defined as being greater than half, the results of this quantitative 
analysis support the rejection of the null hypothesis. H3 is accepted and objective three is 
determined; the majority of ASG attacks occur in areas largely populated and 
administered by Muslims. 
 Little has changed in the analysis of attack distribution between the TO and the 
RO. The addition of the Lanao Del Sur and Maguindanao provinces add five more events 
to the map analysis, yet the overall patterns remain the same. A lower frequency of 
bombings within the ARMM says that explosives are better suited to distant targets. 
While this may just be a preference in the attack type based on operational capacity, it 
may also support the claim that bombings do not make as much money as armed attacks 
or kidnappings. For the purposes of this research, bombings outside of the RO are 




all objectives because the assaults are clustered in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and 
Tawi-Tawi, known constituency areas for the ASG. Seventy three percent of all hostage 
takings take place within the ARMM. Checks on target type display that the victims are 
chosen primarily for ransom value, but there is little concern given to their religious ties. 
As with Tausug ethnocentricity, Islam is a large foundation of the ASG’s political 
goals. Pursuing targets within these regions would do more to attract the attention of the 
federal government, heralding the deployment of troops and police assets into the ASG’s 
backyard. 
Objective #4: Determine if ASG attack history indicates a shift from political 
terrorism to for-profit crime between 1994 and 2008. 
 
The fourth objective is met by conducting a qualitative assessment of ASG history 
to determine what events in the timeline match Dishman’s (2001) three-point checklist: 
1. The ASG must have experienced changing circumstances that forced it to dedicate 
a significant amount of its energy to profit-driven criminal acts.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, Abdurajak is the accepted ideological father 
of the ASG. His strong religious beliefs combine with his guerilla experiences in 
Afghanistan to create a leader that stayed focused on political goals. This is marked by 
the infrequent, yet politically-driven attacks that occurring during his tenure as the ASG’s 
leader. The same social capital he accrued with the mujahedeen fighters allowed him to 
keep in contact with his Afghan cohort long after the soviet struggle and eventually 
establish ideological and logistical ties to Al Qaeda. This meant that money, supplies and 
training went to the ASG at regular intervals during his reign. Very little for-profit 




Upon Abdurajak’s death, command of the group transferred to his brother, 
Khadafi Janjalani, who along with other ASG subcommanders, immediately increased 
the amount of profit-driven criminal acts engaged by the group (Singh, 2007). The reason 
for this is that the logistical links held with Al Qaeda slowly eroded after Abdurajak’s 
death, until finally the international terrorist organization no longer chose to support the 
ASG. Certainly, the cessation of supplies and training occurred over a span of time and 
have other contributing factors. The threshold moment for the inevitable cutoff started 
with Abdurajak’s death according to Abuza (2003) and Rogers (2004). Therefore, the 
changing circumstance in the ASG’s timeline is the death of its founder, Abdurajak 
Janjalani in December of 1998. 
2. The ASG must have experienced a higher quality of group sustainability 
(spending capital and member income) after engaging in profit-driven criminal 
acts. 
 
Under Khadafi’s leadership, the ASG became better paid, trained and equipped as 
they utilized the funds acquired from criminal activities to reinvigorate their operations 
(Chalk et al., 2009). This in turn led to increased incidents of extortion and kidnapping 
for ransom as the group attempted to bolster its war chest (ICPVTR, 2007). Group 
recruitment was at an all-time high and temporal analysis indicates a higher frequency of 
hostage takings (Figure 4.4) and armed assaults (Figure 4.5) during the tenure of Khadafi 
Janjalani. 
 These increases in hostage taking and armed assault frequencies are indicative of 
an organization that is accruing capital for continued operations (Gunaratna, 2003). What 
is most interesting about this trend is that even with the additional funds and personnel, 




(Chalk et al., 2009). Where did the money go? Scholars believe that it was into the 
pockets of the ASG membership (Ressa, 2003). 
3. The ASG must demonstrate an unwillingness to seek a negotiated settlement for 
the sake of prolonging the very struggle that affords it criminal revenue. 
 
Since Abdurajak’s death, the ASG has been unwilling to negotiate a settlement 
with the Filipino government. Even in light of the Muslim “victories” incurred for the 
Moro cause, such as the establishment of the ARMM and the transformation of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) into a legitimate political authority (Hedman and 
Sidel, 2000), the ASG retains its goal of establishing a separate sovereign Muslim state in 
the southern Philippines. It has never once come to the negotiation table, even when its 
membership numbers were reported to be around 200 (Chalk et al., 2009). To this day the 
ASG continues to operate in the Sulu Archipelago unwilling to compromise with the 
government, yet still conducting few (if any) attacks with their foundational separatist 
goals at the forefront.  
In conducting the hot spot analysis for this project, a pattern emerges indicating 
an increased localization of attacks within the provinces of Basilan and Sulu during the 
early years of Khadafi’s reign of leadership. The research timeframe for this period is TF 
Delta, and the data indicate that ASG attacks center directly onto the Constituency 
Overlay for all attack types (Figure 4.6). In fact, many of these are targeted in the lower-
income areas of society. Data sources (START, 2010) claim that the victims are 
politically low-value targets such as aid workers (hostage takings) and rank-and-file 
police officers and locals (bombings and armed assaults). According to criminology 
scholars, the pattern of deadlier events is indicative of retaliatory attacks against local 




(Finckenauer, 2007). This pattern peaks again at the end of the timeline and shows no 
chance of voluntarily waning (Abuza, 2008). 
Using Dishman’s (2001) transformation theory, the data indicate that a terror-to-
crime shift in the operational goals of the ASG did occur. Temporal analyses display 
concentrations of criminal revenue activity after the death of Abdurajak that are localized 
inside of the CO. However while this research establishes an argument for transformation 
and lends it empirical support, identifying the exact moment of transformation is difficult 
because both criminal and terrorist actors must deal in illicit activities to upkeep their 
operations. Illegal activities may generate funding for both types of organizations, but it 
is the destination of illegally generated funds that is the strongest measure on whether 
armed groups are participating in political terrorism or crime. 
 
Results of Temporal Analysis 
  The temporal analysis of this research is geared toward a better understanding of 
how events distribute across time (frequency and location) in direct reference to the 
constituency overlay. As previously mentioned, the CO should be the least likely area for 
attacks to occur as it is the zone most likely to contain the highest concentration of 
popular political support. In analyzing the ebb and flow of attacks into the CO, patterns 
emerge that give clues to the ASG’s operational focus. Specifically, where they chose to 





 The first step in the temporal analysis is to divide the 143 events in the data set by 
timeframe with GIS methods, then organize the results into tabular data (Table 4.1) and a 
chart (Figure 4.7) for visualization.   
 This display suggests an operational peak during the dates of TF Delta (2/19/2000 
– 2/18/2002) and another smaller spike in the remainder months of TF Hotel (2/19/2008 – 
12/28/2008). The next step is to divide the 79 events that appear within the CO by 
timeframe and then organize the results into tabular data (Table 4.2) and a chart (Figure 
4.8) for visualization and comparison. 
 While the individual attack patterns vary, the “All Attacks” line is nearly identical 
to its counterpart on the dataset chart. There are two operational peaks, TF Delta and TF 
Hotel. For reference, Abdurajak perished in the early part of TF Charlie, indicating that 
the remainder of Charlie and (later) Delta are during the time when Khadafi assumed 
control of the ASG and ramped up their number of sorties. In correlating these two 
charts, it is concluded that the increase in operations occurred mostly in the CO, the 
ASG’s political backyard. According to this research, this is an indicator for criminality. 
 To serve as a check for this claim, the 64 events located outside of the CO are 
arranged by timeframe and then organized into tabular data (Table 4.3) and a chart 
(Figure 4.9) for visualization and comparison. Should the operational peaks and troughs 
be similar to the earlier charts, then the similarities can be dismissed as an overall 
operational trend rather than a geo-specific pattern. 
The figure representing attacks outside of the CO has little similarity to the CO 
dataset and charts. It contains one peak for TF Echo that is closely mirrored by the 




operational trend and displays that the increase in operations during TF Delta and TF 
Hotel are geographically dependent on the CO. While only one of the temporal analyses 
conducted for this research, the chart comparison does give strength to a terror-to-crime 
transformation for the ASG.  
 As the CO encompasses all three of the foundational overlays for this research, 
only one analysis of mean center progression is conducted with it as the reference area. 
Mean center measurements are plotted for each timeframe to observe what migrations of 
activity occur during the ASG timeline and how they compare to chart trending (Figure 
4.10). 
 The results of the mean center progression provide additional insight into the 
operational history of the ASG. Points Alpha, Bravo and Charlie (Abdurajak’s Reign) are 
distributed across the Basilan Strait in indication of the ASG’s sporadic operations on 
both Mindanao and Basilan provinces during the early stages of the group. Points Echo, 
Foxtrot and Golf are noticeably drifting away from Basilan in reaction to the joint US-PH 
military crackdown initiated in 2002 and sustained until 2007 (ICPVTR, 2007). As for 
TF Delta and TF Hotel, these points are located within the CO, demonstrating a link 
between the periods of peak operational efficiency and the areas of their primary political 
support.  
 Switching from the “event-centric” focus of mean center analysis to a more “area-
centric” approach, the Getis – Ord hot spot analysis produced results that are in 
congruence with mean center and chart visualizations. As with mean center, only one 
series of hot spots is generated with the CO as the reference area. This is because the 




provinces within the study area are assigned values based on the number of attacks that 
occur within their boundaries. Afterwards, hot spot rendering is generated through 
ArcGIS to produce this series of images. 
 
Timeframe Alpha: 2/18/1994 – 2/18/1996  
 Figure 4.11 displays the hot spot output for TF Alpha. During this period, the 
ASG was in its foundational stages, engaging in some political attacks and building its 
base of community support and capital (ICPVTR, 2007). The operational hot spots 
consist of the island provinces of Basilan and Sulu and the Mindanao province of 
Zamboanga Sibugay. In contrast, the easternmost two-thirds of Mindanao island is 
displayed as a cold spot with the province of Bukidnon appearing as the coldest (less than 
two standard deviations away from the mean). This timeframe encompasses 13 attacks 
total: 1 armed assault, 4 bombings and 8 hostage takings.    
 
 
Timeframe Bravo: 2/19/1996 – 2/18/1998  
Figure 4.12 displays the hot spot output for TF Bravo. During this period, the 
ASG was falling into its operational pace, engaging in predominantly political attacks 
and fewer hostage takings. The hottest spot is the province of Zamboanga Sibugay on 
Mindanao. But note that the operational frequency spreads out (between one to two 
standard deviations) across Basilan, Sulu and all three provinces of the Zamboanga 
peninsula. As with TF Alpha, the easternmost two-thirds of Mindanao Island are 
displayed as cold spots, but Bukidnon is no longer the coldest. This timeframe 




Timeframe Charlie: 2/19/1998 – 2/18/2000  
Figure 4.13 displays the hot spot output for TF Charlie. This is a threshold period 
for the ASG as Abdurajak is slain in a gun battle on 12/18/1998 and his brother, Khadafi, 
takes over the group and begins his operational ramp-up (Chalk et al., 2009). The 
operational hot spots consist of the island provinces of Basilan and Sulu and the 
Mindanao province of Zamboanga Sibugay. Again, the easternmost two-thirds of 
Mindanao Island are displayed as cold spots. However the eastern provinces of Davao 
Oriental, Compostela Valley and Davao del Norte have shifted from cold to neutral 
colors. This timeframe encompasses 21 attacks total: 2 armed assaults, 10 bombings and 
9 hostage takings.        
  
 
Timeframe Delta: 2/19/2000 – 2/18/2002   
Figure 4.14 displays the hot spot output for TF Delta. Khadafi has complete 
control of the ASG and the benefits of criminal activities like kidnap-for-ransom, 
extortion and racketeering are becoming evident to members. Group recruitment is at an 
all time high. This is an operational peak in the dataset. The hot spots all but withdraw 
from Mindanao and become focused on Basilan and Sulu provinces. Zamboanga Sibugay 
and Tawi-Tawi provinces are the next hottest within one to two standard deviations. With 
the exception of Zamboanga Sibugay, Mindanao goes cold until TF Hotel. This 
timeframe encompasses 31 attacks total: 8 armed assaults, 12 bombings and 11 hostage 








Timeframe Echo: 2/19/2002 – 2/18/2004   
Figure 4.15 displays the hot spot output for TF Echo. During this period, Khadafi 
scaled back the ASG’s ransoming practices in reaction to Operation Balikatan, a joint 
US-Philippine military operation aimed at undoing the ASG (ICPVTR, 2007). The 
operational hot spots drop to within one to two standard deviations in the CO due to the 
group spreading out to avoid capture. This timeframe encompasses 20 attacks total: 4 
armed assaults, 12 bombings and 4 hostage takings.    
 
 
Timeframe Foxtrot: 2/19/2004 – 2/18/2006 
Figure 4.16 displays the hot spot output for TF Foxtrot. The ASG has escaped the 
wrath of Balikatan and are slowly reassembling in the Tausug provinces. Operational hot 
spots spike to greater than two standard deviations in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. The 
remainder of the study area is cold. This timeframe encompasses 17 attacks total: 4 
armed assaults, 12 bombings and 1 hostage taking.    
 
 
Timeframe Golf: 2/19/2006 – 2/18/2008  
Figure 4.17 displays the hot spot output for TF Golf. During this period, the AFP 
launched Oplan Ultimatum, another massive military offensive against the ASG. This 
proved a threshold event for the ASG, as Philippine counterterrorism efforts eventually 
cornered and killed Khadafi Janjalani on 9/4/2006. As with TF Foxtrot, the operational 
hot spots remain greater than two standard deviations in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. 




drops to between one and two standard deviations less than the mean. This timeframe 
encompasses 12 attacks total: 3 armed assaults, 6 bombings and 3 hostage takings.    
      
Timeframe Hotel: 2/19/2008 – 12/28/2008 
Figure 4.18 displays the hot spot output for TF Hotel. Encompassing only 10 
months and 9 days, TF Hotel is an operational peak for this dataset as it has the third 
highest number of attacks. The operational hot spots remain greater than two standard 
deviations in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. But now the study area shows a “warming” 
of the Zamboanga peninsula and Zamboanga Sibugay measuring between one and two 
standard deviations greater than the mean. This timeframe encompasses 18 attacks total: 
0 armed assaults, 7 bombings and 11 hostage takings.    . 
 The results of hot spot analysis display timeframes Alpha and Charlie as having 
provinces with a frequency of events greater than two standard deviations both inside and 
outside of the CO. In addition, TF Bravo, while displaying a frequency of attacks 
between one and two standard deviations within the CO, has a concentration of greater 
than two outside of the CO in the province of Zamboanga Sibugay. When Abdurajak 
perishes and Khadafi assumes command, the hot spots become centralized on the CO, 
never moving off the Sulu Archipelago but only “cooling off” slightly during TF Echo; 
the period of time when the military crackdown was at full strength.   
 
The Decision Ruling 
 The results of these analyses culminate in the testing of the decision rule. 




overlay in place, the final analysis can be conducted in preparation for bringing this 
research project to a conclusion. As mentioned in the research design, the decision rule is 
made up of three parts:   
1. 50% or greater of ASG attacks will occur in the “Constituency Overlay,” an 
area made up of the overlapping provinces within the poverty, Tausug and 
religion overlays. 
 
2. The operational peaks in the ASG timeline are focused within the CO. 
 
3. The operational peaks in attack data will coincide with Dishman’s 
benchmarks for the ASG. 
 
For Part One of the decision rule, overlay analysis displays that 79 of 143 
individual events occur within the CO. This amounts to 55% of the entire attack dataset. 
These results display that the major part of ASG attacks have occurred within the CO.   
In regards to Part Two, the chart (Figure 4.7) created during the temporal analysis 
section of this research indicates TF’s Delta and Hotel as the periods of peak operation 
for the ASG. This research supports that these operational peaks are directly related to the 
CO because chart visualization (Figure 4.8), mean center progression (Figure 4.10) and 
hot spot rendering (Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.18) all display TFs Delta and Hotel as being 
focused on the provinces within the CO and not outside of it. 
The final part of the decision rule matches the empirical distribution of ASG 
peaks to the ASG’s manifestation of Dishman's (2001) terror-to-crime transformation 
benchmarks. Explained in the results for objective four, the first benchmark (changing 
circumstance) for the ASG is the death of Abdurajak Janjalani in TF Charlie. This is a 
threshold moment, as attacks nearly double after Khadafi’s ascent in the latter parts of TF 




The second benchmark (higher quality sustainability) is quantitatively displayed 
by the increase in hostage takings and armed assaults (Figures 4.4 and 4.5) by the ASG 
following Abdurajak’s death. These armed assaults and hostage-takings are revenue 
generating operations and their steady increases in TFs Charlie, Delta and Hotel 
demonstrate a grab for money and the increased personnel necessary to accomplish these 
tasks. 
The final benchmark (unwillingness to negotiate) is evident through qualitative 
analysis of the years of operation since the ascension of Khadafi and since his death in 
September 2006. The ASG have made little demands, other than ransoms. They continue 
to engage in small funding operations in the wake of the ARMM’s establishment, 
government negotiations with the MILF and almost constant military and police pressure. 
Commanders of the ASG have changed more than three times since the death of Khadafi, 
but the group’s modus operandi remains the same (Cox, 2009). The greater evidence to 
the group’s loss of extremist credibility is the criticism it has received from other Moro 
liberation organizations (Abuza, 2003). The trend is that all the ASG does is take for 
themselves, never giving back to its core constituency or the Moro cause. 
The results of this research meet the three points of the decision rule. As such, it is 
concluded that the majority of ASG attacks are driven towards crime due to the attack 
history’s tendency towards a high frequency of moneymaking attacks within the areas of 
constituency. This is demonstrated during the times of peak operational efficiency (TF 
Delta). For when the ASG had the initiative and capability; the leadership chose to focus 
its attacks on the community of popular support rather than projecting its power outside 





Figure 4.1: Comparison of attacks and the poverty overlay. 
 
 





Figure 4.3: Comparison of attacks and the religion overlay. 
 
Figure 4.4: A temporal display of hostage takings according to ASG Leadership. 
 







Figure 4.6: Hot Spot analysis output for all attack types in TF Delta. 
 
 








Alpha 2/18/1994 – 2/18/1996 13 4 1 8 
Bravo 2/19/1996 – 2/18/1998 11 7 3 1 
Charlie 2/19/1998 – 2/18/2000 21 10 2 9 
Delta 2/19/2000 – 2/18/2002 31 12 8 11 
Echo 2/19/2002 – 2/18/2004 20 12 4 4 
Foxtrot 2/19/2004 – 2/18/2006 17 12 4 1 
Golf 2/19/2006 – 2/18/2008 12 6 3 3 




Figure 4.7: Attack frequency chart for entire dataset.
 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Events by Timeframe (CO)
TF Dates 
Alpha 2/18/1994 – 2/18/1996
Bravo 2/19/1996 – 2/18/1998
Charlie 2/19/1998 – 2/18/2000
Delta 2/19/2000 – 2/18/2002
Echo 2/19/2002 – 2/18/2004
Foxtrot 2/19/2004 – 2/18/2006
Golf 2/19/2006 – 2/18/2008
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Figure 4.8: Attack frequency chart for events occurring within the CO.
 
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of Events by Timeframe (Outside of CO)
TF Dates 
Alpha 2/18/1994 – 2/18/1996
Bravo 2/19/1996 – 2/18/1998
Charlie 2/19/1998 – 2/18/2000
Delta 2/19/2000 – 2/18/2002
Echo 2/19/2002 – 2/18/2004
Foxtrot 2/19/2004 – 2/18/2006
Golf 2/19/2006 – 2/18/2008
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Figure 4.9: Attack frequency chart for events occurring outside of the CO.
 





























































Based on the criteria of the decision rule, the patterns of ASG attack data indicate 
that ASG operations have been more inclined towards criminal goals rather than 
ideological goals. This analysis of the ASG’s attacks legitimizes the positions of the 
Philippine government and terrorist scholars like Abuza (2008), Ressa (2003) and Tan 
(2007) and their claims that the group has undergone a terror-to-crime transformation and 
now only participates in banditry. Research objective 4 and its link to Dishman’s 
transformation theory serves as the theoretical indicator that the ASG transformation has 
occurred. The spatial and temporal analyses included provide an empirical and 
quantitative foundation to this qualitative link. The methods are inseparable.  
 
Implications of Research 
The results of this research carry certain implications that are applicable to both 
the scholarly community and counterterrorism policymaking. The first scholarly 
implication is that this research is able to link political scientific qualitative analysis with 
the empirical and quantitative methods available through a GIS. While political science is 
no stranger to the use of mapping for analysis, the utilization of computer-generated 
geospatial analysis for substate actor data strengthens qualitative conclusions by 




methods are applied to attack data, organizational goals and any changes they undergo 
can be isolated, identified and modeled for possible prediction. 
The second scholarly implication to this research is that it validates and 
strengthens the Dishman terror-to-crime transformation theory by adding another armed 
extremist faction to its analytical lens. The ASG can now stand alongside the FARC, 
FMLN and UWSA as a political terrorist organization whose drift from political violence 
to crime has been authenticated by Dishman (2001). This success of the theory will 
eventually foster additional research of other terrorist organizations. 
The final scholarly implication of this research is that it adds to the body of ASG 
literature. Even with the setbacks the group has incurred in the past, the ASG has proven 
to be a hardy and resilient entity, even if just in name. Now in its 17th year, the ASG 
continues its routine of hostage taking, extortion and racketeering in Basilan, Sulu and 
Tawi-Tawi. If the attacks that have taken place after the extent of this dataset were to be 
added to this research, newer and more-refined conclusions can be made regarding the 
group’s motivations and legitimacy.  
As to the policymaking implications, this research is capable of aiding Filipino 
government officials by giving them strong quantitative evidence on how the ASG 
operates and their organizational goals. This information is invaluable to anti-ASG 
propaganda campaigns as it allows them combine numbers and empirical figures with 
reports, narratives and interviews to create a whole body of information that, if targeted 
correctly, can undercut popular support. 
Another policy implication to this research is that it can add a geographic 




ASG areas of operation can give clues on the potential locations of strongholds, targets 
and sources of criminal income. This empowers military and public safety officials by 
granting additional insight on how to better direct aggressive measures like patrols and 
checkpoints and constructive initiatives like community outreach. In addition, when the 
modeling and analysis of this research is combined with ongoing intelligence efforts, it 
can aid authorities with the identification of activity trends, changes in group dynamics 
and the anticipation of attacks. 
The final policy implication for this research is that the methods of this project 
can be applied to any violent political substate actor whose ties to a political ideology or 
agenda are suspect. It is not dependent on any particular location and its methodologies 
are universally applicable provided that there is attack data and a documented history of 
the organization. So whether it is an ethno-separatist movement in the mountains of 
Turkey or a religious militia in the US, this research methodology has the potential to aid 
counterterrorism efforts by examining for any shifts in goals or philosophy.         
 
Secondary Research Conclusions 
Several spatial and temporal patterns emerge from the analysis of this dataset that 
for all intents and purposes; serve as secondary conclusions to this project. In regards to 
spatial patterns, the majority of ASG attacks occur in the southern third of the Philippines 
due to the increased likelihood of safe havens in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi provinces. 
Also, a majority of all ASG attacks occur in the Constituency Overlay, where the 
poverty, Tausug and ARMM layers overlap. Of the three different attack types, armed 




 In regards to the analysis across time, Khadafi’s ASG conducted more attacks 
than Abdurajak’s ASG overall. Eighty-six attacks for Khadafi compared to thirty one 
attacks for Abdurajak, over twice as many (twenty-seven attacks in the dataset occurred 
after Khadafi’s death). Of all three attack types, the greatest operational increase of 
Khadafi’s ASG is in kidnapping for ransom. In addition, attack intensities wane between 
TF Echo and TF Golf, probably due to a sustained US-Philippine crackdown against the 
ASG occurring at the time. The two time periods of ASG operational increase (TF Delta 
and TF Hotel) were most felt by the people living within the CO. Analysis of hot spots 
indicate that the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi remained very active (greater 
than two standard deviations) for armed assaults and hostage takings during the post-
Abdurajak time period of the data. 
The fulcrum for the ASG terror-to-crime transformation is the death of Abdurajak 
Janjalani. Yet by itself, the attack data do not indicate whether the ASG is more inclined 
in either direction. If the only goals of this research had been to validate H1, H2 and H3, 
the resulting geographic analysis would not have been enough to determine that a 
transformation had occurred. Instead, target analysis and other qualitative examinations 
(like Objective 4) are necessary to understand the intent of a terrorist organization and 
determine if it is transforming into a criminal operation. The attack patterns of the ASG 
do not change drastically enough over time to indicate a transformation by geographic 
methods alone. There is always a shadow of doubt that exists in the data. Researchers can 
never be certain that the attacks are not politically driven without further information. 
Analyzing the behavioral patterns of either criminals or political actors is not a 




examine everything from political geostrategic maneuvering to car theft patterns. Yet 
why is it so difficult to blend these foci and examine when an organization shifts from 
political activities to crime?  
For terrorism, the answer is because both terror and crime are intrinsically linked. 
While this research can establish an argument for transformation and lend it empirical 
support, identifying the transformation is not cut and dry because both criminal and 
terrorist actors must deal in illicit activities to upkeep their operations. Furthermore, the 
lines between crime and terror are blurring because of increased counterterrorism efforts 
and the operational diversification of criminal organizations. Strong counterterrorism 
initiatives tend to push terrorism organizations to crime. This is evident in case studies 
involving the FARC of Colombia and the United Wa Army of Myanmar (Dishman, 
2001).  
 On the other hand, criminal organizations often attempt to gain influence in 
political arenas to facilitate illicit operations. Mafia members have been known to 
actively participating in Italian politics (Lyman & Potter, 2004) and there are incidents 
where the Japanese Yakuza have influenced Japanese government officials to ease their 
business operations (Finckenauer, 2007). Still, any foray of study into the blurred world 
of terror and crime is beneficial to scholarship as a whole because each effort builds upon 








Future Directions of Research 
 While the optimal analytical tool is still a ways off, there are some future paths to 
this research to be explored. They can be divided into two directions that examine either 
the Abu Sayyaf Group or the application of this methodology to another case study. 
 For the ASG route, a possibility exists to compare the results of this research to 
other empirical and qualitative studies on the ASG to identify any similarities or 
differences in the outcomes. Then a closer look at the methods can reveal what strengths 
and weaknesses both projects possess. A second possibility would be to conduct 
interviews of regional counterterrorism experts in the Philippines to explore the empirical 
methods they used to conduct their research. This would add some local analytical 
strength to these results and allow both bodies of scholarship to build upon each other. 
 For the case study route, the first step would be to identify two extremist 
organizations that were known to have undergone a terror-to-crime transformation. The 
Colombian FARC and the United Wa Army of Myanmar are well-suited for this task. 
The next step would be to apply this thesis’ methodology to the attack data of these 
organizations to determine if similar conclusions can be made. This would strengthen the 
validity of this methodology and provide a clearer picture of the groups under 
examination. After that, an exploratory case study path could include the application of 








Transference of Methodology to Other Groups 
 This analysis is structured so that it may be applied to other groups for whom a 
terror-to-crime transformation is suspected. The methodology involving the concept of 
the CO and its connectivity to Dishman’s benchmarks is uniformly applicable. What 
must be accounted for, however, are the variables and procedures needed to define the 
CO of the study area. The overlays used for this analysis, poverty, ethnicity and religion, 
may not be the best fit for other groups depending on the history of the region and the 
primary goals of terrorists. A thorough qualitative assessment of the terrorist group and 
the study area must be conducted in order to isolate the three areal variables that will 
combine to create the CO. Three or more variables should be the target for establishing 
the CO in that it creates a Venn diagram-like isolation of constituency areas and provides 
a more focused area for study.  
 Defining the variables that will compose the CO can be done through the 
examination of the target terrorist group’s original goals. Nearly all terrorist groups 
establish some kind of goals or targets for political change (Hoffman, 1998). These goals 
can either be documented in some kind of manifesto or, as with the ASG, established 
through general consensus of the membership. This methodology, while effective in 
discerning the philosophical changes of the ASG, is not without its limitations. The 
methodology in this research is best used for analyzing terrorist organizations in the 
developing world. This is because the drive to change from a politically oriented 
organization into a profit-driven model is best accentuated in areas where abject poverty 
is rampant. The participants undergoing this change are motivated by avarice and an 




world as the standards of living are often more elevated and extremist operators are 
capable of maintaining their political objectives because their basic needs are already 
being met through either gainful employment or outside clandestine funding. The second 
limitation to this process is that the target terrorist group must have a large body of 
validated attack data to apply to the CO. If the dataset is too small, then the conclusions 
drawn from the analysis may be inaccurate or spurious. This hazard is most visible in 
conducting hot spot analysis as hot polygon values depend not only on the number of 
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